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For any system with limited statistical knowledge, the 
combination of evidence and the interpretation of sampling 
information requires the determination of the right reference class 
(or of an adequate one). 
The present note (1) discusses the use of reference classes in 
evidential reasoning , and (2) discusses a first implementation of 
Kyburg's rules for reference classes, and what we now know about 
implementing such a system in the future. This paper contributes the 
first frank discussion of how much of Kyburg's system is needed to be 
powerful; how much can be computed effectively, and how much is 
philosophical fat. 
1. Reference Classes. 
AI discussions on probability have perenially 
revolved around two problems: what to do with 
conflicting evidence, and how to get by without a lot of 
objective statistical knowledge. Each of these problems 
can be addressed by an adequate theory of how 
reference classes are selected. 
Hans Reichenbach left modern philosophers of 
probability with a single task: in order to determine an 
event's probability, determine the narrowest reference 
class to which the event belongs, and about which 
adequate statistics are known [Rei49]. Suppose I know 
about the next Mets game, "m", that it is one in which 
Dwight Gooden will pitch, "Dm", and one to be played 
at home, "Hm", and one in which Keith Hernandez will 
bat, "Km"; I want to know the probability that the 
game will be a Mets' victory, P("Vm"). I have statistics 
about (or have an expert's degree of belief in) the per 
cent of Mets home games that are Mets' victories, 
"%( {x: Hx}, {x : Vx} ) ",or just "%(H, V)", 
and the per cent of Dwight Gooden home games that 
are Mets' victories, 
"%(H& D,V)", 
but no statistics (or beliefs) relating Keith Hernandez 
games to victories, whether at home or not, whether in 
conjunction with Dwight Gooden or not. 
Some are willing to supply the missing numbers, 
e.g., "%(H& D& K, V)", 
by procedure or by fiat. But A.I. has left the age when 
inventing such numbers was condoned. So something 
must be done with the statistics that are legitimately 
known. 
According to Reichenbach and his followers, if 
"%(H & D, V)" is adequately precise, say a narrow 
interval, then it gives the probability of the win. This 
is because "H & D" defines a narrower class than "H". 
Statistics for the narrowest class may not be available. 
Suppose "m" is an "M" game, "Mm" is true, where "M" 
is the predicate that individuates "m": i.e., "games 
identical to m". "M" could be analyzed into, say, the 
open sentence, 
"H & D & Ml & M2 & . .. " 
Then "M" defines the narrowest class to which m 
belongs. But "%(M, V)" is surely not known, or else 
P("Vm") is a trivial query. We don't usually want the 
probability to come from statistics on V's among M's. 
Rules are needed to point out that only the "H & D" 
part of "M" is useful here. Systems of probability have 
been constructed on such rules. 
Reichenbachian rules say what to do with evidence 
when it is conflicting or incomplete. When 
appropriate, the rules mandate combination of 
evidence via purely set-theoretic axioms. Set theory 
allows the construction of "%" statements from other 
"%' statements. At other times, the rules throw out 
information that is simply irrelevant. Discarding 
irrelevant information is natural in evidential 
reasoning though it is suppressed by the applied 
statistician in practice. Rules governing this practice 
need to be made explicit. 
There is a close analogy to Bayesian methods. If 
"Hm& Dm& Km " 
is the total evidence, then P("Vm") is given by 
P(''Vm"I"Hm & Dm & Km">. 
Suppose, however, that this conditional is not known 
and that what is known is just 
' 
P<"Vm")"Hm & Dm") and P<"Vm")"Hm"). 
Then some logical principles should determine that the 
total relevant, or total useful knowledge is "Hm & 
Dm". These logical principles should say what to do 
when there is some knowledge about P("Vm" I "Hm & 
Dm & Km") when it is only poor knowledge, such as 
belonging to the interval [.1, .9]. 
Even if the Bayesian uses point-probabilities, there 
is the matter of interpreting sampling information. 
Some Bayesians feel they should base their probability 
judgements not only on opinion, but on prior opinion 
modified by the experience of sampling. Sampling 
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leads to k victories out of n Mets games, which leads to 
a posterior distribution on the probability of a victory. 
But which sampling? There are the samples of (a) Mets 
games played at home, (b) Mets games pitched by 
Dwight Gooden at home, and (c) Mets games in which 
Keith Hernandez went to bat. There may be no games 
in which Gooden pitched, Hernandez went to bat, and 
the Mets were at home. What if there was only one 
such game? There are no doubt differences in the 
amount of data in each sample; hence, different 
samples lead to posteriors based on different amounts 
of experience. If the Bayesian valu-es experience, the 
choice matters. 
Before asking in knee-jerk fashion what are to be 
the "weights for combination," some have asked what 
are the logical grounds for choosing among them. If the 
Mets are dilierent from last year, last year's record 
doesn't matter. If they're on a winning streak, the 
relevant sample information should again be 
restricted. What would reflect this in the data? There 
may be Bayesian answers to such questions, but they 
are answers to the question of which reference class to 
use. 
2. Kyburg's Strategy and Its Capabilities. 
Henry Kyburg based his theory of probability on 
the determination of reference classes (so did John 
Pollock [Pol83, 84]). Kyburg's definitions first 
appeared in 1961 as a solution to the problems that led 
Carnap to Bayesianism. So it cannot be classified 
under Peter Cheeseman's taxonomy [Che85] as 
"invented new formalism." [Kyb74] is the complete 
presentation. [Kyb83] is a more cogent formulation. 
2.1. The Idea. 
the former is better, because its class is narrower. 
Between 
%(H, V) = (.4, .8) and %CK, V) = (.3, .7), 
neither is better. Since there is disagreement, neither 
is useable. Another class must be sought. 
In order to determine the probability of t, a 
sentence in a formal language, relative to a base of 
knowledge, 
1. Find statements of the form: "t • (x E Zl"; 
i.e., isolate the events relevant to determining the 
probability in question; 
e.g., "I win bet b • m E the set of Mets victories". 
2. Now for each sentence "x E Y", 
i.e., for some property Y of x, 
e.g., "m E the set of home games: {x : Hx}" 
find the strongest statistical statement for property Z 
among classY: "%(Y, Z) = [p, q) "; 
A statistical statement is stronger than another if the first's 
[p, q] interval is nested in the other's. 
These are the potentially useful statistics. 
Y's are "candidate" reference classes. 
3. The 4-tuple <x, Y, Z, [p, q) > is an "inference structure for 
t." 
4. Collect all such inference structures and call the set S. 
5. Find IS•, the strongest member of S (the one with the 
strongest statistics) that "dominates" every member of S 
that "disagrees" with it (these are defined below). 
Inference structures disagree when their [p, q]­
intervals don't nest. IS1 dominates IS2 when IS1 
"reflects" IS2 but IS2 doesn't reflect ISl. ISl can reflect 
IS2 in any of a number of ways. The most interesting 
way is for the class of one to be a subset of the class of 
the other. If the statistics for Gooden games at home 
disagree with the statistics for games at home, then 
subset reflection will allow the former statistics. 
Subset reflection takes the most specific class when 
The system follows Reichenbach, except that it 
uses interval-valued statistics for classes. A class is 
better than another if it is narrower, unless its 
interval contains the interval associated with the other there is disagreement. 
class. So if 2.2. The Achievement. 
%(H& D& K, V) is [O, l) and %CH, Vlis[.3, .5) , 
the latter is better. Nested intervals are supposed to 
signal agreement; overlapping or disjoint intervals are 
supposed to signal disagreement. 
Note that Kyburgjust doesn't intersect or take 
unions of overlapping intervals in order to resolve 
their disagreement. If 
%(H & D & K, V> is [.1, .6) and %<H, V) is [.4, .8), 
Here's the achievement. Distinguish probability 
assertion, 
Prob(''x E Z") = [p, q), 
from statements about specific frequencies in classes, 
"%(Y, Zl = [p, q)". 
Then provide rules for selecting among such frequency 
statements in order to determine probability. 
Whatever information used to be used to determine or 
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combine probabilities, subjective or objective, can now 
be used to determine or combine frequencies. But 
where there is conflict there is no special problem. If 
one source of conflict reflects the other, there is 
deference. If there is no reflection, appeal is made to a 
third source, usually one that permits only a weaker 
conclusion. Where there is lack of information, again 
there is no special problem. The strongest permissible 
conclusion is drawn relative to the accepted knowledge. 
2.3. Specific Constructions. 
If "%(H, V)" and "%(K, V)" are known, but not 
"%(H & K, V)", some bounds on the latter can be 
constructed with computational effort, if there is 
knowledge of "%(H, K)", "%(K, H)", and so forth. The 
problem in general is an extrex:nization of a non-linear 
objective with linear constraints. 
But even if %(H & K, V) can't be determined to a 
narrow interval, there are other reflecting classes. 
When the knowledge base contains: 
"%CH, V) = [p1, qtJ" and "%(K, V) = [p2, q2]". 
it should also contain: 
"x E V ao < x, x > E V x V"; "< x, x > E H x K "; 
and "%CH x K, V x Vl = [PtP2,qlq2]", 
i.e., an inference structure based on 
H X K. (!SX) 
The product class is always a candidate inference 
structure, and it embeds a kind of independence 
assumption. It reflects the inference structures based 
respectively on Hand on K. 
It will almost always be dominated, in turn, by the 
inference structure based on the class: 
"{<x,y> :x E H and y E K and x E V • y E V}". <ISXB> 
And the per cent of these that are in V x V is 
[ g(ph P2), g(qh Q2l ]; 
g(x, y) = xy/(1- x- y + 2xyJ, 
which is easily calculated. Using this inference 
structure would also be like making a kind of 
independence assumption (in this system, a provably 
better one, when evidence about the same event is 
combined). 
But it too can't be used unless it dominates all 
others with which it disagrees, including whatever is 
known about joint information: 
"{ < x, y > : x E (H & K) and y E <H & K) and x = y}" . 
In general, interference could come from any structure 
of the form 
"{ < x, y > : x E H and y E K and x E W a y E W . .. }" 
where V is not a subset of W. For instance, 
"{<x,y>: x E H and y E K 
and x E IV & K) "" y E CV & Hl }" 
could interfere if its statistics were known to disagree. 
We've identified only the inference structures 
based on (ISX) and on (ISXB) which reflect structures 
based on H and on K, which have statistics that are 
easily computable from "%(H, V)" and "%(K, V)". The 
one based on (ISXB) always dominates the one based 
on (ISX), so it is most interesting when there is conflict, 
and weak joint information. 
3. Lessons from Implementation. 
3.1. So Much Set Theoretic Computation. 
Lesson: 
The better you are with s_et theory, the better you'll 
be at computing reference classes. 
Finding candidate reference classes and 
determining reflection are by far the major 
computations. Both are intensively set-theoretic. 
3.l.a. Finding Classes. 
Finding candidate classes starts with chaining on 
biconditionals. We implemented the biconditional 
chaining, but in practice, it's dispensable logical 
convenience. We want the probability of t. The 
equality reasoner leads to a set of pairs <Xi, Zi >, such 
that for each i, 
<IFF t <MEMBER x; Z;)) is true. 
For each of these XiJ we have to find the sets to which it 
is known to belong. There is a choice (we implemented 
the latter, but now prefer the former): 
a) chain forward on those sets to which Xi is known 
to belong, and their supersets, Yj. Then either look for 
statistical statements 
(% (yi Z;) (p q)J, i.e., %(yi Z;l = [p, q], 
or construct them. 
bLchain backward to try to prove 
-�--� 
<MEMBER X; Yjl 
for each Yj whose Zi statistics are known. This method 
requires that all inferred statistics be done by forward 
chaining. For those classes, e.g. Yk and YI, found to 
contain Xi, try to discover reflection among them by 
attempting prgofs of the form 
<SUBsET Yk Y!l· 
3.l.b. Computing Reflection. 
Then there is the matter of reflection. Determining 
reflection is either determining one set is a subset of 
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another, or chaining on statistically equivalent 
inference structures, looking for subsets. Again, the 
computation is intensively set-theoretic. 
With educated algorithmic design, it's possible to 
avoid having to compute some reflection relations. 
Deciding disagreement of inference structures is a 
much cheaper computation than trying to decide 
reflection. IfiSl and IS2 are inference struc.tures, ISl 
disagrees with IS2, and 151 reflects 152, then 152 can't 
possibly be the reference class. So at the very least: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Sis the set of inference structures, obtained under (b). 
CHOICES.-S. 
CHOICES is a priority queue ordered by strength. 
Until CHOICES empties do { 
Select s• from CHOICES 
(s• is maximally strong among CHOICES). 
For every s E S that disagrees with s• do { 
If s• reflects s 
then{ 
CHOICES.- CHOICES- s; 
if s reflects s• then exit with FAILURE. 
} 
else exit with FAILURE. 
If not(FAILUREJ then exit. 
Take statistics from s•. 
The deletions in (i) are the improvement over the naive 
algorithm. The line, (ii) can also be omitted for most 
purposes; reflection is anti-symmetric in real 
knowledge bases. 
3.1.c. Reflection without Computation. 
We can now explain why (a) seems more attractive 
than (b). Even with the shortcuts for computing 
reflection, there are too many proofs attempted. 
Instead, chain forward through known inclusion 
relations using one's favorite set-theoretic axioms. For 
every set found, one has simultaneously determined a 
candidate class and identified which other classes it 
reflects, i.e., which sets are its supersets. 
The relations betw�en inference structures direct 
the search, rather than lead to more proofs. 
3.2. Reducing the Language. 
Lesson: 
Set-theoretic language just gets in the way. The rules are too 
general: use a subset of the rules and restrict the languages 
over which probability is computed. 
The set-theory that is needed is significantly less 
elaborate than what Kyburg envisions, or what Brown 
[Bro78] or Pastre [Pas78] have provided for, in the past. 
3.2.a. Restricting the Set-Forming Operations. 
It is important to represent and manipulate sets 
like {x : x E H and y E K and x E V = y E V}. 
But for all the effort required to implement this set­
theoretic structure faithfully, it is quite inexpensive to 
supply the relevant information manually. In fact, 
rather than name the set with a complex expression 
that shows its structure, in practice we found it easier 
just to give it a basic name and assert the relevant 
relations to other sets. 
We found we could get along with a quite restricted 
language, where all sets are named by creative 
intersection. The details are not important. What is 
important is that the constructions from section 2.3, 
and the Bayesian constructions can be named with less 
set-theoretic machinery. 
EMORPH is the union of 
{<x,y>:x=y},and 
{<x,y,z>: x = y = z}, etc. 
(so it acts like it has polymorphic dimension on 
intersections; "E"for "equality"). 
(BMORPH V) is also a union, of 
{ <x, y > : x E V • y E V}, and 
{ <x,y z> : x E Va y E V • z E V}, etc. 
then 
_(I (X a b) EMORPH) is 
{<x,y>: x E a and y E b andx = y}, 
And 
(I (X a b) <BMORPH V)) is 
{ <x, y > : x E a andy E b and x E V • y E V}. 
With this kind of naming, all of the classes we've 
identified as important can be named and manipulated 
easily. A simple reasoner about inclusions, such as a 
type reasoner, will suffice if it can be made to handle 
· multidimensional objects, intersections, and some 
sophisticated functions like those of functional 
programming languages. 
3.2.b. A Minimal Language. 
An even starker language we've considered for 
applications uses no asserted subset relations. No two 
sets with primitive names are known to be subsets. 
Two sets are subsets only if one is syntactically the 
intersection of the other with some additional sets. In 
this language, we represent only the classes, their 
intersections, and their "BMORPH" combinations: i.e., 
the undominated independence class with computable 
186 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
statistics, that look like (ISXB) discussed in section 2.3. information can be arbitrated outside of the probability 
Define the function extern-prod. Let calculus. 
!extern-prod ( (a b c  d) ) V ), 
or just [abed], be 
Also let 
{ < x, y, z, t > : x E a and y E b and z E c and t E d and 
X= y = Z = t}. 
(exterri-prod ((a b c) (d)) V ), 
or just [abc,d], be 
{<x, y, z, t> :x =y = z andzE V .-tE V and 
z E (a & b & c) and t E d}. 
In the notation that uses only bracket and comma, V is 
implicit. [abc,d] is the class that would be formed if one 
took the joint information about the class a & b & c, 
and did the (ISXB)-style product with the class d. 
In this language, it's very easy to see which classes 
to appeal to when there is conflict, and what are the 
reflection relations among inference structures built on 
these classes. Suppose x E [abed]. For the probability 
of x in V, appeal first to %([abed], V). If there is 
knowledge about o/o([abc], V) and %(d, V), then 
compute o/o([abc,d], V). 
Consider using it if it is stronger than %([abed], V). 
If it is, then [abc,d] must also agree with all that are 
computable among: [ab,cd], [abd,c], [ac,bd], [acd,b], 
[ad, be], [bcd,a], [bd,a,c], and so forth. The only classes 
that [abc,d] is allowed to disagree with are those 
reflected classes such as [ab,c,d] and [ab,c], which can 
be determined by the following easy rule. Reflected 
classes are composed of constituents, such as "ab", and 
"c", and "d". And for each constituent, e.g., "ab", there 
is some constituent of [abc,d], "abc", which contains all 
of the first constituent's characters (set names). 
-4. Concluding Discussion. 
Kyburg's system does solve some perplexing 
questions inherent in evidential reasoning, including: 
1) when does an independence assumption conflict with 
joint information; 2) which conclusion can be drawn, if 
any, when there is disagreeing evidence; and 3) ho.w to 
choose between evidence that is strong but ill-founded, 
and evidence that is well-founded but weak. 
The key elements are: 1) the use of intervals, so 
that probability assertions can vary in strength, and 2) 
the distinction between frequency and probability 
assertion, so that conflict among statistical 
We implemented the system in some generality, 
and found that the difficulties were in deciding how 
much set-theoretic language and how much set­
theoretic inference to use. 
In order to simplify, we studied exactly which 
inference structures would be useful, of the many that 
satisfy the definitions. In particular, we know that 
when there is conflict between two classes, e.g., %(H, 
V) and %(K, V), one should appeal to %(H & K, V) if it 
is known, or else to o/o( [H, K] , V), if it is agreeable with 
o/o(H & K, V). 
A satisfactory general inference engine could be 
based on the language of a multidimensional type 
reasoner, and applications could be successfully based 
on the even starker language, which makes all 
reflection relations obvious by inspection. 
In Kyburg's favor, the system copes with the 
traditional problems as advertised. In his disfavor, the 
system does not have much locality; bits of knowledge 
in all sorts of corners can be relevant, and are not 
easily pre-processed. So it is promising for diagnosis 
and identification problems where. time is not as 
important as error, where carefully integrating 
evidence is more important than processing lots of 
information quickly. 
The next step is to see how well these ideas fare in 
applications. 
Henry Kyburg was indispensable in this study. Matt Miller's smaller 
implementation was useful for comparison. 
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